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"A TERRIBLE BUSINESS" 
BLACK BOOK COPY 
Several weeks ago, in my request to faculty for annual reports, 
I quoted a passage from Richard Merrill's recent book, Teaching Values 
in College. The theme of that book, more than the title of this address, 
reveals the broad topic I want to raise with you this morning. The 
source of my title will become apparent in a few moments. For now, let 
me simply say the the broad topic has to do with issues of integrity, 
truth, and values in higher education. 
The immediate provocation for this speech was a conversation 
with Dean Lauter in which he remarked on the increasing number of cases 
heard by the Lawrence Honor Council in recent years. In fact, the number 
of cases has doubled from 1971-72 to 1981-82. That observation, of course, 
could be made about American colleges and universities generally and is 
graphically illustrated by an episode two years ago at the University of 
Maryland. As students prepared to use the multiple exits to leave a large 
examination room, all doors but one were closed and locked. As the students 
filed out the remaining exit, they were stopped for an i.d. check designed 
to ferret out "ringers" who had taken the exam for other students. The 
Maryland sting operation rounded up several such ringers and constituted 
the university's most dramatic response to what had become a serious 
epidemic of cheating. 
The Maryland case was but a dramatic instance of what has 
become a pervasive phenomenon in higher education. In the 1950 1 s, Tom 
Lehrer earned fame and fortune on his witty lyrics, "plagiarize, plagiarize, 
let no one's work evade your eyes" but in the 1980's this is no longer a 
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laughing business. In various surveys taken in 1980, one-third of the 
students at Princeton, Dartmouth, Amherst, and Johns Hopkins admitted 
to cheating at least once and two-thirds of the undergraduates at Stanford 
confessed to plagiarizing papers. On some campuses, students have broken 
into computer files to alter grades while off campus a new service industry 
has emerged to sell pre-written term papers on a wide variety of topics. 
One such company, currently under investigation by the U.S. Postal Service, 
had over 10,000 essays for sale and advertised them in college newspapers 
as "a solution at last to the student's term paper problems." 
These forms of dishonesty have, at the same time, been accompanied 
by other, no less serious episodes. The theft and/or destruction of books 
has reached such proportions that some large institutions are suffering 
losses in the millions of dollars annually. In our community, similar 
behavior appeared to occur with alarming frequency last year with books taken 
from both the library and from students at Downer or in the halls. 
Undergraduates are not the only culprits here. It was recently 
reported that the man nominated to be the state education commissioner in 
New Jersey had turned in a 121-page doctoral thesis, 66 pages of which 
were lifted verbatim from seven sources with no attribution or acknowledg-
ment. To make matters even more ludicrous, the man defended the practice 
by labeling his graduate program "experimental" and referring to his dis-
sertation as a "major departure from a strictly scholarly approach." It 
surely merits that assessment, as well as a few others. Like deceitful. 
Blatant deceit of this sort has occurred in the upper reaches of 
academe as well. In a celebrated case that began in 1979, it was determined 
after an extensive scientific audit that two Yale professors had plagiarized 
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a research paper; further investigation uncovered the fact that one of them 
had engaged in fudging, fabrication, and widespread destruction of laboratory 
data. To date, eleven papers have been retracted from the scientific liter-
ature; two hitherto promising and productive careers in science have been 
aborted. 
These examples are distressing enough, but what is equally appall-
ing is the way in which people have responded to this wrong-doing. Students 
have rationalized their cheating by referring to the pressures of a tight 
job market, of graduate school admission standards, or family expectations 
of achievement. Academic professionals make similar claims, with one of 
the Yale researchers claiming that his actions "were done in the midst 
of significant pressure to publish these data as fast as possible so as 
to obtain priority." Fabrication and plagiarism were employed in order to 
achieve recognition and results. 
What we have, in large part, is a situation in which the motivation 
and justification for intellectual accomplishment are extrinsic to the 
academic enterprise itself. The enterprise itself is not perceived as 
inherently worthwhile and honorable but is seen merely to be a means to 
some other ends. And it is in service to or out of fear of those other 
ends that individuals seem prepared to cheat. If plagiarizing a paper 
will elevate my grade, enhance my GPA, raise my class rank, and thereby 
improve my credentials for some post-graduate position, then plagiarize I 
will. There is, of course, a lazy version of this same instinct which accepts 
cheating--by copying a paper or even buying one--simply because it is easier 
than working on one's own. 
The result is a cavalier and utilitarian view of honesty. 
When ulterior motives prevail or when the opportunity to cut corners 
- 4 -
arises, the activity of the moment--be it a paper, an examination, or an 
experiment--loses its absolute and inherent meaning and takes on a relative 
one. It is shaped not by a set of values pertaining to the activity, but 
by its relationship to some other desideratum. 
This situation perhaps should distress us more than it surprises 
us. For the extent to which intellectual activity is perceived to have no 
intrinsic worth, to the extent to which higher education is viewed simply 
and solely as a path to some job, the values embedded in intellectual 
activity and academic inquiry will be ignored or denigrated. The problem, 
I believe, is not that students don't understand the provisions of the 
Honor Code, but that they have not been led to appreciate the fundamental 
nature of what we do in the university. 
Writing in 1968, Douglas Heath expressed this nature well. 
11 lntellectual activity, 11 he argued, 11requires honesty, objectivity, 
openness to alternatives, flexibility, humility, respect for dissenting 
views, and so on. Associated with intellectual activity is an ethic 
about what is app~opriate intellectual activity. A person who fabricates 
or distorts information, consciously ignores contradictory data, plagiarizes 
the work of others, and interprets information to fit some purpose other 
than truth loses the trust and respect of others. A liberal education 
must educate for the ethic of truth if it is not to produce intellectual 
psychopaths. 11 
The ethic of truth is, by its very nature and essence, a demanding 
and embracing ethic. It is the ethic which gives rise to the principle 
of academic freedom. And at Lawrence, it is the ethic from which our 
Honor Code is derived. The Honor Code expresses our communal commitment 
to the academic virtue of the ethic of truth; the Code does not create 
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that commitment but only embodies it. Ideally, we should pledge allegiance 
to that Code and to the ethic for which it stands. Unhappily, however, 
students too often misunderstand the Honor Code as simply a set of rules 
and procedures for writing papers, conducting experiments, and taking tests. 
Thus, students often fail to connect the nature of a violation to the larger 
principle that is at stake. To fail to cite sources or to paraphrase another's 
argument without giving proper acknowledgment is not just to transgress 
some arcane technical procedure invented by fusty intellectuals. It is to 
damage the very spirit, purpose, and value of intellectual inquiry. Hence, 
plagiarism, cheating, and deception do not merely violate the Honor Code, 
but they destroy the integrity of the community. The Honor Code, then, is 
not only an institutional device; it represents a personal requirement and 
responsibility for the community's well.~ being .. 
Our concern with Honor Code violations is legitimate, but we 
must not give in to the simple seduction of assuming that the problem is 
merely one of student deceit in response to ulterior motives or so-called 
academic pressure. The problem h~re may have other sources, among them the 
failure of colleges and universities to be more explicit and forward in 
proclaiming and enacting the larger purposes of their enterprise. 
Let me try to elaborate that potentially obscure and ~mplex 
statement. Fundamentally, the root question that informs higher education has 
to do with what it means to be human. The claims of and for such education--
especially liberal education--often transcend, even disregard, the curricular 
structure of colleges and universities. Here are a few examples: to wit, 
Herbert Spencer: "Education has for its object the formation of character"; to 
wit, William Mather Lewis: "Education is not concerned primarily with intel-
lectual luxuries, but with elements which make the individual a valuable member 
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of society11 ; to wit, the Lawrence catalogue of 1934: "The ultimate purpose 
[of Lawrence] is the establishment and improvement of standards--standards of 
thought and expression, of taste and interest, of character and ethics, of 
health and sane living. 11 
These statements, and the many others like them that can be adduced 
to make the point, suggest a concern with the consequences of education that 
relate not so much to intelligence as to character and citizenship. In short, 
they relate to questions of the nature of being human and of being members of 
a civic or even global community. Usually, however, such claims are made at 
the beginning and at the end of a student's college experience and are 
rarely invoked or addressed throughout it. The dilemma for us today is 
that the university has become so fragmented into divisions, departments, and 
disciplines that these larger claims for education can .become at least 
diffused and at worst abandoned. 
In one important respect, of course, this diffusion is explicable 
even as the abandonment is lamentable. It is explicable for all sorts of 
right reasons, among them the growing methodological sophistication of the 
disciplines and the attending specialization of academic research. We have 
assuredly gained much, in knowledge and insight, by these developments. But 
accompanying them is the insidious temptation--at least as perceived from 
the perspective of the liberal arts college--for the teacher or student to be 
drawn further and deeper into areas of restricted and rarified disciplinary 
technique and interest and hence away from the broader questions and concerns 
that affect us as humans. 
Graduate schools often, maybe usually, perpetuate this mentality and 
treat this temptation as a blessing. And for some years now, Lawrence has 
recognized that it cannot take its clues regarding its mission and style 
- 7 -
from those graduate programs which seem bent on producing Ph.D.s who know 
more and more about less and less and whose idea of teaching is little different 
from cloning. What we have been faced with, Alston Chase wrote, are academics 
who, "having received a highly specialized schooling in graduate school, regarded 
themselves as specialists training other specialists in the same field. Thus 
a professor of philosophy would teach philosophy to students who would become 
teachers of philosophy, and so on, apparently forever." That definition of 
teaching runs precisely counter to the aims of liberal education. 
W. Jackson Bate, in a recent article on "The Crisis in English 
Studies," spoke to a similar point. Bate criticized the consequences of 
excessive specialization in the field, especially as it relates to the 
narrowing of interest and expertise, the accompanying emphasis on mastery of 
minute subareas, and the resulting loss of range and breadth. At the end 
of his essay, Bate calls for a return to a broader, more humanistic vision. 
"Most intelligent people," he writes, "do occasionally ask what life is all 
about. Of course, this can be overdone, and we end in paralysis. Yet if 
English Studies [and we might extend his claim here to encompass the liberal 
arts and science disciplines collectively] say that these questions are not only 
unanswerable but not even worth asking, they are flying the white flag of 
surrender." 
Bate's caution is worth heeding. What it suggests is that it is 
possible for the professional preoccupations of a discipline's practitioners 
to blunt the discipline's connections with the objects and topics it is 
supposed to illuminate and with the questions of meaning and purpose that 
students might properly ask. My own field of American Studies may well be 
among the more culpable here. For the past few decades the literature of the 
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field has contained books and articles attempting to theorize about American 
Studies, seeking to legitimize the field, trying to define and describe its 
methodology. This pursuit passed beyond the sublime several years ago when 
some scholars began constructing elaborate theories of "interdisciplinarity"--
a bogus word which was a fitting description of what had become a bogus quest. 
Exploring the American experience in its many facets had been subsumed to a more 
abstract and arcane search for disciplinary legitimacy. 
Beyond what might be styled the self-aggrandizing tendencies of the 
disciplines, higher education today suffers from another tendency that helps 
to explain our present situation. As Richard Morrill has argued, we too often 
adopt a view of the student that assumes that as a learner he or she is split 
betWeen reason and emotion, knowledge and action, cognition and affection, and 
lives in a world in which facts are separated from values. If and where this 
view dominates, higher education can become an arena in which questions of 
morality, ethics, and values have no standing since they are consigned 
precisely to that part of the learner not addressed in the classroom. When 
values are excluded from intellectual discourse or academic inquiry, they are 
located in the realms of emotion on the one hand or personal preference on the 
other and thus beyond the purview of education. Values, then, become an 
expression of one's feelings or opinions and are neither counted nor challenged 
in the learning process. 
There is no easy remedy for this situation and any effort to address this 
issue is likely to illust·rate the observation and warning of the philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein. 11Values. 11 he wrote. 11A terrible business. You can at best 
stammer when you talk about them. 11 Well, it may be time for us to stammer. It 
may be time for us to open ourselves to explorations of values, not to set out 
to establish or even seek uniformity of values but at least to admit issues of 
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values and ethics to a central place in our academic community. 
Put in another way, we should not only tolerate but even embrace 
questions of personal commitment in our teaching and learning. This mode, of 
course, once permeated Lawrence and other independent colleges and universities, 
either in the form of explicitly religious convictions or of clearly-stated 
rules of behavior and conduct. I am not suggesting that we attempt to 
recapture that mode. But I do think that we need to examine the contours and 
consequences of our present state in which we eschew questions of personal 
commitment, avoid questions of morality and ethics, and adopt a kind of 
relativistic posture toward values. As a result, we invite a timidity about 
such matters that bodes ill for our aspirations regarding character and 
citizenship. 
Last year I heard an anecdote that illustrates this point. In an 
introductory philosophy course, the instructor was attempting to alert the 
students to the kinds of issues and forms of inquiry that the class would be 
confronting. "OK," the professor said, "how many of you believe in God?" Not 
one student raised a hand. "All right, then," the professor went on, 11 how 
many of you don't believe in God?" Again, not one student raised a hand. 
Turning to a student in the front row, the professor said "Look. Either you 
believe in God or you don't believe in God. Which is it?" And the student 
replied, "I don't know. I wasn't in class yesterday." It may have been at 
this same college where the dean distributed a survey asking if students were 
prepared to make commitments. Five percent responded yes and five percent 
answered no. 
This indeed may be timidity, but we find similar behavior appearing 
in the guise of intellectual sophistication. I can recall this kind of 
situation in divinity school where practically every statement uttered about the 
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Bible or the faith was prefaced with .. Bultmann says11 or "Brunner argues" 
or 11 Barth claims" so that what was being forwarded was almost always cloaked 
in the language of some distant and/or dead European theologian and never in 
the words or out of the conviction of the speaker. Thus, if the statement was 
challenged, the speaker was not implicated; Bultmann, Brunner, or Barth was. 
Hence, discussions and conversations often became little more than intellectual 
party-games·of quoting third-party authorities back and forth. One of my 
professors articulated a principled rationale for this activity by ~sserting that 
his role was to be sure that students could identify the furniture of the 
household of faith, but not to concern himself with whether or not they used 
that furniture or were members of the household. 
In an important respect, of course, we applaud this kind of scholarly 
objectivity and non-doctrinaire approach. To educate is not to indoctrinate 
and that holds for religious belief, political ideology, or personal conviction. 
At the same time, however, we do not want to lapse unwittingly into the position 
where we are subtly indoctrinating students to consider value judgments as 
intellectually below the salt. We do not want our fealty to objectivity to 
banish value questions to the nether realm of idiosyncratic preference. We 
often find, I think, that in our discourse in the university, the ultimate 
put-down, the all-time showstopper, the true mark of erudition is to look 
someone who has just commented on the worthiness or unworthiness of an idea 
or project stone cold dead in the eye and say, with just a hint of a sneer, 
11 that's a value judgment. 11 And everybody else nods sagely and sympathetically, 
pitying the poor blighter who has just exposed hinself to be so egregiously 
un-academic. 
Here is a classic illustration of treating values as simply personal 
preferences, as merely matters of opinion. It is an emanation of the relativ-
izing tendency that is embedded in higher education today in which matters of 
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judgment, taste, and value are either denied or else treated as ancillary. 
What we create, therefore, is a situation in which judgment gives way to 
opinion, tast;e to preference, and value to feeling. When questions of values 
and of human significance have no standing in academic and intellectual 
pursuits, or when they are admitted only as a way of illustrating that there 
are competing values to be considered--that right and wrong fall under the 
same category of "it all depends"--then we have said that such questions 
really don't matter, are apart from our central preoccupations, and are in 
fact matters of opinion, preference, and feeling. 
I am obviously not suggesting that the solution is to impose values 
as an ingredient of instruction or to test for values on examinations. I am 
arguing that questions of human significance--of judgment, taste, and value--
should not be precluded from our teaching and learning. The challenge, I 
believe, is to seek and steer a middle course between routinized relativism 
on the one side and intellectual indoctrination on the other. We need to 
rediscover the capacity to ask of ourselves and each other the devastating 
question "So what?" and to confront vexing issues of values and human concern 
squarely, honestly, and openly. 
In a fine speech to the entering students last Sunday, Illene Noppe 
made reference to the work of William Perry, who argued that during the 
college experience, students· move from a position of moral absolutism to one 
of moral relativism, a move which Perry views as salutary.~ It is worth noting, 
however, that 'Perry also claims that there is a further move past moral relativism 
to a posture of personal affirmation of cerbain truths and values. The 
question for us, I would suggest, is to ask whether students move along 
this spectrum as a matter of course or whether there is anything in the 
teaching-learning process or in the college environment which assists or 
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promotes their doing so. My suspicion is, first, that we have collectively 
paid little heed to this question. My concern is, second, that insofar as we 
have considered the question, we may be assuming the former answer when we should 
have been worrying about the latter. In short--and to repeat--I' do not think 
that our aspirations for the development of character and citizenship should be 
expressed only as prologue and afterwo-rd to a Lawrence education; they should 
be in the text as well. 
The refusal to consider and address these matters in our teaching 
and learning may be one of liberal education's chief liabilities. As 
President Frank Rhodes of Cornell University has pointed out, liberal education 
often tends to emphasize qualities of "liberation from11 without paying 
sufficient attention to questions of "liberation for." "Liberation from 
certain things is a means and not an end," he wrote. "Its purpose is to 
allow informed commitment rather than rootless abstention. Our colleges 
today are more successful in challenging assumptions than in encouraging 
conclusions, more concerned with analysis than synthesis. This reflects 
the temper of the age but it has its dangers, for a liberal education, 
narrowly conceived, can turn a man or woman into a permanent critic, a 
convinced cynic, a detached observer of society, rather than a persuaded 
participant." 
As aims of education, informed commitment, conclusions, and synthesis 
are compatible with attention to judgment, taste, and values in our teaching 
and learning. How this is to be accomplished in given cases needs our thought 
and attention. That it can enliven and enrich our mission seems to me a 
hope that we all should share. There is a marvelous passage in Robert Pirsig' s 
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance in which the author/teacher confronts 
his English class after he gave an assignment on "What is quality in thought 
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and statement? 11 He writes: 
The atmosphere was explosive. Almost everyone seemed as frustrated 
and angered as he had been by the question. "How are we supposed 
to know what quality is?" they said. "You're supposed to tell us!" 
Then he told them he couldn't figure it out either and really wanted 
to know. He had assigned it in the hope that somebody would come 
up with a good answer. 
That ignited it. The roar of indignation shook the room. 
Before the commotion had settled down another teacher had .stuck 
his head in the door to see what the trouble was. 
"It's all right," Phaedrus said. "We just accidently stumbled 
over a genuine question, and the shock is hard to recover from. 11 
Perhaps we will not create shocks as dramatic as Pirsig's fictive 
one. But perhaps too we should begin to consider ways to register something 
on the classroom Richter scale. Professor David Price of Duke University 
provides a direction for us here in his discussion of courses in ethics 
and public policy. Such a course, he argues, "should sensitize students 
to their own value commitments and to those embedded in the ideological 
and cultural premises they accept and the analytical techniques they employ. 
It should also force them to consider alternative, competing values and per-
spectives. But I am reluctant to leave it at that: students should move 
beyond the appreciation of complexity to making and justifying some of the 
hard ethical choices that must, in fact, be made. It is critically important 
to move beyond 'laying values out on the table' to precise ethical argument 
and analysis." 
Price's point is suggestive, not prescriptive. Precise ethical 
argument and analysis may not be the strategy for every situation. But 
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whether one is confronting hard ethical choices in public policy, or issues 
of personal identity in psychologyy'Or questions about beauty in art or lit-
erature, or problems of environmental consequences in the sciences, we need to 
admit questions of value to the arena of discussion and debate. The moral 
arguments of a poem, the social implications of a political system, the 
ethical consequences of a scientific technique, and the human significance of 
our responses should have a place in our classrooms and dormitory rooms. 
To deny that place is to relinquish any claim or attempt to link thought 
and action, knowing and doing. It is to bifurcate ourselves in ways wholly 
contradictory to our larger intentions and ambitions that liberal learning 
develop character, inform citizenship, and improve standards. 
So I would hope that our collective commitment to the ethic of truth 
and our mutual openness to issues of value and human significance will become 
evident characteristics of this special place, the Lawrence community. 
Rather than focus our attention on the provisions of our Honor Code, we should 
instead express our commitment to the ethic of truth that undergirds it. 
That is a value which informs our doing and perhaps by our devotion to that 
value we can begin the process of receptivity to other values and, in our teach-
ing, and learning and living together enhance and extend the quality of our 
lives, individually and together, within and beyond the university. Then 
may Lawrence be a place that embodies the assertion of Plutarch, that 
"the very spring and root of honesty and virtue lie in good education." 
"Values. A terrible business. You can at best stammer when you 
talk about them." Wittgenstein was right. Values are a terrible business 
and I have no doubt stammered. But I invite all of us to stammer, students and 
faculty alike, in classrooms and at lunchtables, in offices and in residence 
halls. Silence is easy. But stammering is at least speech, and we should care 
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enough for each other and for our university to talk with one another--to 
stammer together--about values. 
